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Diffstat (limited to 'presentations')
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/default.nix | 47 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/drake-meme.png | bin | 0 -> 246872 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/nixos-logo.png | bin | 0 -> 90542 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/notes.org | 89 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/presentation.tex | 251 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/quine-relay.png | bin | 0 -> 52350 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | presentations/bootstrapping-2018/result.pdfpc | 142 |
7 files changed, 529 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/default.nix b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/default.nix new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..c4ac8a472a78 --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/default.nix @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +# This derivation builds the LaTeX presentation. + +{ pkgs ? import <nixpkgs> {} }: + +with pkgs; let tex = texlive.combine { + inherit (texlive) + beamer + beamertheme-metropolis + etoolbox + euenc + extsizes + fontspec + lualibs + luaotfload + luatex + luatex-def + minted + ms + pgfopts + scheme-basic; +}; +in stdenv.mkDerivation { + name = "nuug-reproducible-slides.pdf"; + src = ./.; + + FONTCONFIG_FILE = makeFontsConf { + fontDirectories = [ fira fira-code fira-mono ]; + }; + + buildInputs = [ tex fira fira-code fira-mono ]; + buildPhase = '' + # LaTeX needs a cache folder in /home/ ... + mkdir home + export HOME=$PWD/home + # ${tex}/bin/luaotfload-tool -ufv + + # As usual, TeX needs to be run twice ... + function run() { + ${tex}/bin/lualatex presentation.tex + } + run && run + ''; + + installPhase = '' + cp presentation.pdf $out + ''; +} diff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/drake-meme.png b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/drake-meme.png new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4b036754384f --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/drake-meme.png Binary files differdiff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/nixos-logo.png b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/nixos-logo.png new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ce0c98c2cabb --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/nixos-logo.png Binary files differdiff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/notes.org b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/notes.org new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..363d75352e62 --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/notes.org @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +#+TITLE: Bootstrapping, reproducibility, etc. +#+AUTHOR: Vincent Ambo +#+DATE: <2018-03-10 Sat> + +* Compiler bootstrapping + This section contains notes about compiler bootstrapping, the + history thereof, which compilers need it - and so on: + +** C + +** Haskell + - self-hosted compiler (GHC) + +** Common Lisp + CL is fairly interesting in this space because it is a language + that is defined via an ANSI standard that compiler implementations + normally actually follow! + + CL has several ecosystem components that focus on making + abstracting away implementation-specific calls and if a self-hosted + compiler is written in CL using those components it can be + cross-bootstrapped. + +** Python + +* A note on runtimes + Sometimes the compiler just isn't enough ... + +** LLVM +** JVM + +* References + https://github.com/mame/quine-relay + https://manishearth.github.io/blog/2016/12/02/reflections-on-rusting-trust/ + https://tests.reproducible-builds.org/debian/reproducible.html + +* Slide thoughts: + 1. Hardware trust has been discussed here a bunch, most recently + during the puri.sm talk. Hardware trust is important, as we see + with IME, but it's striking that people often take a leap to "I'm + now on my trusted Debian with free software". + + Unless you built it yourself from scratch (Spoiler: you haven't) + you're placing trust in what is basically foreign binary blobs. + + Agenda: Implications/attack vectors of this, state of the chicken + & egg, the topic of reproducibility, what can you do? (Nix!) + + 2. Chicken-and-egg issue + + It's an important milestone for a language to become self-hosted: + You begin doing a kind of dogfeeding, you begin to enforce + reliability & consistency guarantees to avoid having to redo your + own codebase constantly and so on. + + However, the implication is now that you need your own compiler + to compile itself. + + Common examples: + - C/C++ compilers needed to build C/C++ compilers: + + GCC 4.7 was the last version of GCC that could be built with a + standard C-compiler, nowadays it is mostly written in C++. + + Certain versions of GCC can be built with LLVM/Clang. + + Clang/LLVM can be compiled by itself and also GCC. + + - Rust was originally written in OCAML but moved to being + self-hosted in 2011. Currently rustc-releases are always built + with a copy of the previous release. + + It's relatively new so we can build the chain all the way. + + Notable exceptions: Some popular languages are not self-hosted, + for example Clojure. Languages also have runtimes, which may be + written in something else (e.g. Haskell -> C runtime) +* How to help: + Most of this advice is about reproducible builds, not bootstrapping, + as that is a much harder project. + + - fix reproducibility issues listed in Debian's issue tracker (focus + on non-Debian specific ones though) + - experiment with NixOS / GuixSD to get a better grasp on the + problem space of reproducibility + + If you want to contribute to bootstrapping, look at + bootstrappable.org and their wiki. Several initiatives such as MES + could need help! diff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/presentation.tex b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/presentation.tex new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d3aa61337554 --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/presentation.tex @@ -0,0 +1,251 @@ +\documentclass[12pt]{beamer} +\usetheme{metropolis} +\newenvironment{code}{\ttfamily}{\par} +\title{Where does \textit{your} compiler come from?} +\date{2018-03-13} +\author{Vincent Ambo} +\institute{Norwegian Unix User Group} +\begin{document} + \maketitle + + %% Slide 1: + \section{Introduction} + + %% Slide 2: + \begin{frame}{Chicken and egg} + Self-hosted compilers are often built using themselves, for example: + + \begin{itemize} + \item C-family compilers bootstrap themselves \& each other + \item (Some!) Common Lisp compilers can bootstrap each other + \item \texttt{rustc} bootstraps itself with a previous version + \item ... same for many other languages! + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Chicken, egg and ... lizard?} + It's not just compilers: Languages have runtimes, too. + + \begin{itemize} + \item JVM is implemented in C++ + \item Erlang-VM is C + \item Haskell runtime is C + \end{itemize} + + ... we can't ever get away from C, can we? + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 3: + \begin{frame}{Trusting Trust} + \begin{center} + \huge{Could this be exploited?} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 4: + \begin{frame}{Short interlude: A quine} + \begin{center} + \begin{code} + ((lambda (x) (list x (list 'quote x))) + \newline\vspace*{6mm} '(lambda (x) (list x (list 'quote x)))) + \end{code} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 5: + \begin{frame}{Short interlude: Quine Relay} + \begin{center} + \includegraphics[ + keepaspectratio=true, + height=\textheight + ]{quine-relay.png} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 6: + \begin{frame}{Trusting Trust} + An attack described by Ken Thompson in 1983: + + \begin{enumerate} + \item Modify a compiler to detect when it's compiling itself. + \item Let the modification insert \textit{itself} into the new compiler. + \item Add arbitrary attack code to the modification. + \item \textit{Optional!} Remove the attack from the source after compilation. + \end{enumerate} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 7: + \begin{frame}{Damage potential?} + \begin{center} + \large{Let your imagination run wild!} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 8: + \section{Countermeasures} + + %% Slide 9: + \begin{frame}{Diverse Double-Compiling} + Assume we have: + + \begin{itemize} + \item Target language compilers $A$ and $T$ + \item The source code of $A$: $ S_{A} $ + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 10: + \begin{frame}{Diverse Double-Compiling} + Apply the first stage (functional equivalence): + + \begin{itemize} + \item $ X = A(S_{A})$ + \item $ Y = T(S_{A})$ + \end{itemize} + + Apply the second stage (bit-for-bit equivalence): + + \begin{itemize} + \item $ V = X(S_{A})$ + \item $ W = Y(S_{A})$ + \end{itemize} + + Now we have a new problem: Reproducibility! + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 11: + \begin{frame}{Reproducibility} + Bit-for-bit equivalent output is hard, for example: + + \begin{itemize} + \item Timestamps in output artifacts + \item Non-deterministic linking order in concurrent builds + \item Non-deterministic VM \& memory states in outputs + \item Randomness in builds (sic!) + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Reproducibility} + \begin{center} + Without reproducibility, we can never trust that any shipped + binary matches the source code! + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 12: + \section{(Partial) State of the Union} + + \begin{frame}{The Desired State} + \begin{center} + \begin{enumerate} + \item Full-source bootstrap! + \item All packages reproducible! + \end{enumerate} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + %% Slide 13: + \begin{frame}{Bootstrapping Debian} + \begin{itemize} + \item Sparse information on the Debian-wiki + \item Bootstrapping discussions mostly resolve around new architectures + \item GCC is compiled by depending on previous versions of GCC + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Reproducing Debian} + Debian has a very active effort for reproducible builds: + + \begin{itemize} + \item Organised information about reproducibility status + \item Over 90\% reproducibility in Debian package base! + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Short interlude: Nix} + \begin{center} + \includegraphics[ + keepaspectratio=true, + height=0.7\textheight + ]{nixos-logo.png} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Short interlude: Nix} + \begin{center} + \includegraphics[ + keepaspectratio=true, + height=0.90\textheight + ]{drake-meme.png} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Short interlude: Nix} + \begin{center} + \includegraphics[ + keepaspectratio=true, + height=0.7\textheight + ]{nixos-logo.png} + \end{center} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Bootstrapping NixOS} + Nix evaluation can not recurse forever: The bootstrap can not + simply depend on a previous GCC. + + Workaround: \texttt{bootstrap-tools} tarball from a previous + binary cache is fetched and used. + + An unfortunate magic binary blob ... + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Reproducing NixOS} + Not all reproducibility patches have been ported from Debian. + + However: Builds are fully repeatable via the Nix fundamentals! + \end{frame} + + \section{Future Developments} + + \begin{frame}{Bootstrappable: stage0} + Hand-rolled ``Cthulhu's Path to Madness'' hex-programs: + + \begin{itemize} + \item No non-auditable binary blobs + \item Aims for understandability by 70\% of programmers + \item End goal is a full-source bootstrap of GCC + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + + \begin{frame}{Bootstrappable: MES} + Bootstrapping the ``Maxwell Equations of Software'': + + \begin{itemize} + \item Minimal C-compiler written in Scheme + \item Minimal Scheme-interpreter (currently in C, but intended to + be rewritten in stage0 macros) + \item End goal is full-source bootstrap of the entire GuixSD + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Other platforms} + \begin{itemize} + \item Nix for Darwin is actively maintained + \item F-Droid Android repository works towards fully reproducible + builds of (open) Android software + \item Mobile devices (phones, tablets, etc.) are a lost cause at + the moment + \end{itemize} + \end{frame} + + \begin{frame}{Thanks!} + Resources: + \begin{itemize} + \item bootstrappable.org + \item reproducible-builds.org + \end{itemize} + + @tazjin | mail@tazj.in + \end{frame} +\end{document} diff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/quine-relay.png b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/quine-relay.png new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..5644dc3900e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/quine-relay.png Binary files differdiff --git a/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/result.pdfpc b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/result.pdfpc new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..b0fa6c9a0ef8 --- /dev/null +++ b/presentations/bootstrapping-2018/result.pdfpc @@ -0,0 +1,142 @@ +[file] +result +[last_saved_slide] +10 +[font_size] +20000 +[notes] +### 1 +- previous discussions of hardware trust (e.g. purism presentation) +- people leap to "now I'm on my trusted Debian!" +- unless you built it from scratch (spoiler: you haven't) you're *trusting* someone + +Agenda: Implications of trust with focus on bootstrap paths and reproducibility, plus how you can help.### 2 +self-hosting: +- C-family: GCC pre/post 4.7, Clang +- Common Lisp: Sunshine land! (with SBCL) +- rustc: Bootstrap based on previous versions (C++ transpiler underway!) +- many other languages also work this way! + +(Noteable counterexample: Clojure is written in Java!)### 3 + +- compilers are just one bit, the various runtimes exist, too!### 4 + +Could this be exploited? + +People don't think about where their compiler comes from. + +Even if they do, they may only go so far as to say "I'll just recompile it using <other compiler>". + +Unfortunately, spoiler alert, life isn't that easy in the computer world and yes, exploitation is possible.### 5 + +- describe what a quine is +- classic Lisp quine +- explain demo quine +- demo demo quine + +- this is interesting, but not useful - can quines do more than that?### 6 + +- quine-relay: "art project" with 128-language circular quine + +- show source of quine-relay + +- (demo quine relay?) + +- side-note: this program is very, very trustworthy!### 7 + +Ken Thompson (designer of UNIX and a couple other things!) received Turing award in 1983, and described attack in speech. + +- figure out how to detect self-compilation +- make that modification a quine +- insert modification into new compiler +- add attack code to modification +- remove attack from source, distributed binary will still be compromised! it's like evolution :)### 8 + +damage potential is basically infinite: + +- classic "login" attack +=> also applicable to other credentials + +- attack (weaken) crypto algorithms + +- you can probably think of more!### 10 + +idea being: potential vulnerability would have to work across compilers: + +the more compilers we can introduce (e.g. more architectures, different versions, different compilers), the harder it gets for a vulnerability to survive all of those + +The more compilers, the merrier! Lisps are pretty good at this.### 11 + +if we get a bit-mismatch after DDC, not all hope is lost: Maybe the thing just isn't reproducible! + +- many reasons for failures +- timestamps are a classic! artifacts can be build logs, metadata in ZIP-files or whatever +- non-determinism is the devil +- sometimes people actively introduce build-randomness (NaCl)### 12 + +- Does that binary download on the project's website really match the source? + +- Your Linux packages are signed by someone - cool - but what does that mean?### 13 + +Two things should be achieved - gross oversimplification - to get to the ideal "desired state of the union": + +1. full-source bootstrap: without ever introducing any binaries, go from nothing to a full Linux distribution + +2. when packages are distributed, we should be able to know the expected output of a source package beforehand + +=> suddenly binary distributions become a cache! But more on Nix later.### 14 + +- Debian project does not seem as concerned with bootstrapping as with reproducibility +- Debian mostly bootstraps on new architectures (using cross-compilation and similar techniques, from an existing binary base) +- core bootstrap (GCC & friends) is performed with previous Debian version and depending on GCC### 15 + +... however! Debian cares about reproducibility. + +- automated testing of reproducibility +- information about the status of all packages is made available in repos +- Over 90% packages of packages are reproducible! + +< show reproducible builds website > + +Debian is still fundamentally a binary distribution though, but it doesn't have to be that way.### 16 + +Nix - a purely functional package manager + +It's not a new project (10+ years), been discussed here before, has multiple components: package manager, language, NixOS. + +Instead of describing *how* to build a thing, Nix describes *what* to build:### 17 +### 19 + +In Nix, it's impossible to say "GCC is the result of applying GCC to the GCC source", because that happens to be infinite recursion. + +Bootstrapping in Nix works by introducing a binary pinned by its full-hash, which was built on some previous Nix version. + +Unfortunately also just a magic binary blob ... ### 20 + +NixOS is not actively porting all of Debian's reproducibility patches, but builds are fully repeatable: + +- introducing a malicious compiler would produce a different input hash -> different package + +Future slide: hope is not lost! Things are underway.### 21 + +- bootstrappable.org (demo?) is an umbrella page for several projects working on bootstrappability + +- stage0 is an important piece: manually, small, auditable Hex programs to get to a Hex macro expander + +- end goal is a full-source bootrap, but pieces are missing### 22 + +MES is out of the GuixSD circles (explain Guix, GNU Hurd joke) + +- idea being that once you have a Lisp, you have all of computing (as Alan Key said) + +- includes MesCC in Scheme -> can *almost* make a working tinyCC -> can *almost* make a working gcc 4.7 + +- minimal Scheme interpreter, currently built in C to get the higher-level stuff to work, goal is rewrite in hex +- bootstrapping Guix is the end goal### 23 + +- userspace in Darwin has a Nix project +- unsure about other BSDs, but if anyone knows - input welcome! +- F-Droid has reproducible Android packages, but that's also userspace only +- All other mobile platforms are a lost cause + +Generally, all closed-source software is impossible to trust. |
