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-### 1
-- previous discussions of hardware trust (e.g. purism presentation)
-- people leap to "now I'm on my trusted Debian!"
-- unless you built it from scratch (spoiler: you haven't) you're *trusting* someone
-
-Agenda: Implications of trust with focus on bootstrap paths and reproducibility, plus how you can help.### 2
-self-hosting:
-- C-family: GCC pre/post 4.7, Clang
-- Common Lisp: Sunshine land! (with SBCL)
-- rustc: Bootstrap based on previous versions (C++ transpiler underway!)
-- many other languages also work this way!
-
-(Noteable counterexample: Clojure is written in Java!)### 3
-
-- compilers are just one bit, the various runtimes exist, too!### 4
-
-Could this be exploited?
-
-People don't think about where their compiler comes from.
-
-Even if they do, they may only go so far as to say "I'll just recompile it using <other compiler>".
-
-Unfortunately, spoiler alert, life isn't that easy in the computer world and yes, exploitation is possible.### 5
-
-- describe what a quine is
-- classic Lisp quine
-- explain demo quine
-- demo demo quine
-
-- this is interesting, but not useful - can quines do more than that?### 6
-
-- quine-relay: "art project" with 128-language circular quine
-
-- show source of quine-relay
-
-- (demo quine relay?)
-
-- side-note: this program is very, very trustworthy!### 7
-
-Ken Thompson (designer of UNIX and a couple other things!) received Turing award in 1983, and described attack in speech.
-
-- figure out how to detect self-compilation
-- make that modification a quine
-- insert modification into new compiler
-- add attack code to modification
-- remove attack from source, distributed binary will still be compromised! it's like evolution :)### 8
-
-damage potential is basically infinite:
-
-- classic "login" attack
-=> also applicable to other credentials
-
-- attack (weaken) crypto algorithms
-
-- you can probably think of more!### 10
-
-idea being: potential vulnerability would have to work across compilers:
-
-the more compilers we can introduce (e.g. more architectures, different versions, different compilers), the harder it gets for a vulnerability to survive all of those
-
-The more compilers, the merrier! Lisps are pretty good at this.### 11
-
-if we get a bit-mismatch after DDC, not all hope is lost: Maybe the thing just isn't reproducible!
-
-- many reasons for failures
-- timestamps are a classic! artifacts can be build logs, metadata in ZIP-files or whatever
-- non-determinism is the devil
-- sometimes people actively introduce build-randomness (NaCl)### 12
-
-- Does that binary download on the project's website really match the source?
-
-- Your Linux packages are signed by someone - cool - but what does that mean?### 13
-
-Two things should be achieved - gross oversimplification - to get to the ideal "desired state of the union":
-
-1. full-source bootstrap: without ever introducing any binaries, go from nothing to a full Linux distribution
-
-2. when packages are distributed, we should be able to know the expected output of a source package beforehand
-
-=> suddenly binary distributions become a cache! But more on Nix later.### 14
-
-- Debian project does not seem as concerned with bootstrapping as with reproducibility
-- Debian mostly bootstraps on new architectures (using cross-compilation and similar techniques, from an existing binary base)
-- core bootstrap (GCC & friends) is performed with previous Debian version and depending on GCC### 15
-
-... however! Debian cares about reproducibility.
-
-- automated testing of reproducibility
-- information about the status of all packages is made available in repos
-- Over 90% packages of packages are reproducible!
-
-< show reproducible builds website >
-
-Debian is still fundamentally a binary distribution though, but it doesn't have to be that way.### 16
-
-Nix - a purely functional package manager
-
-It's not a new project (10+ years), been discussed here before, has multiple components: package manager, language, NixOS.
-
-Instead of describing *how* to build a thing, Nix describes *what* to build:### 17
-### 19
-
-In Nix, it's impossible to say "GCC is the result of applying GCC to the GCC source", because that happens to be infinite recursion.
-
-Bootstrapping in Nix works by introducing a binary pinned by its full-hash, which was built on some previous Nix version.
-
-Unfortunately also just a magic binary blob ... ### 20
-
-NixOS is not actively porting all of Debian's reproducibility patches, but builds are fully repeatable:
-
-- introducing a malicious compiler would produce a different input hash -> different package
-
-Future slide: hope is not lost! Things are underway.### 21
-
-- bootstrappable.org (demo?) is an umbrella page for several projects working on bootstrappability
-
-- stage0 is an important piece: manually, small, auditable Hex programs to get to a Hex macro expander
-
-- end goal is a full-source bootrap, but pieces are missing### 22
-
-MES is out of the GuixSD circles (explain Guix, GNU Hurd joke)
-
-- idea being that once you have a Lisp, you have all of computing (as Alan Key said)
-
-- includes MesCC in Scheme -> can *almost* make a working tinyCC -> can *almost* make a working gcc 4.7
-
-- minimal Scheme interpreter, currently built in C to get the higher-level stuff to work, goal is rewrite in hex
-- bootstrapping Guix is the end goal### 23
-
-- userspace in Darwin has a Nix project
-- unsure about other BSDs, but if anyone knows - input welcome!
-- F-Droid has reproducible Android packages, but that's also userspace only
-- All other mobile platforms are a lost cause
-
-Generally, all closed-source software is impossible to trust.