//! Implements a library for verifying JSON Web Tokens using the
//! `RS256` signature algorithm.
//!
//! This library is specifically aimed at developers that consume
//! tokens from services which provide their RSA public keys in
//! [JWKS][] format.
//!
//! ## Usage example (token with `kid`-claim)
//!
//! ```rust
//! extern crate alcoholic_jwt;
//!
//! use alcoholic_jwt::{JWKS, Validation, validate, token_kid};
//!
//! fn validate_token() {
//! // serde instances provided
//! let jwks: JWKS = some_http_client(jwks_url).json();
//!
//! let token: String = some_token_fetcher();
//!
//! // Several types of built-in validations are provided:
//! let validations = vec![
//! Validation::Issuer("some-issuer"),
//! Validation::Audience("some-audience"),
//! Validation::SubjectPresent,
//! ];
//!
//! // Extracting a KID is about the only safe operation that can be
//! // done on a JWT before validating it.
//! let kid = token_kid(token).expect("No 'kid' claim present in token");
//!
//! let jwk = jwks.find(kid).expect("Specified key not found in set");
//!
//! match validate(token, jwk, validations) {
//! Valid => println!("Token is valid!"),
//! InvalidSignature(reason) => println!("Token signature invalid: {}", reason),
//! InvalidClaims(reasons) => {
//! println!("Token claims are totally invalid!");
//! for reason in reasons {
//! println!("Validation failure: {}", reason);
//! }
//! },
//! }
//! }
//! ```
//!
//! [JWKS]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517
#[macro_use] extern crate serde_derive;
extern crate base64;
extern crate openssl;
extern crate serde;
extern crate serde_json;
use base64::{decode_config, URL_SAFE};
use openssl::bn::BigNum;
use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
use openssl::hash::MessageDigest;
use openssl::pkey::{Public, PKey};
use openssl::rsa::Rsa;
use openssl::sign::Verifier;
use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
use serde_json::Value;
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;
/// JWT algorithm used. The only supported algorithm is currently
/// RS256.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
enum KeyAlgorithm { RS256 }
/// Type of key contained in a JWT. The only supported key type is
/// currently RSA.
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
enum KeyType { RSA }
/// Representation of a single JSON Web Key. See [RFC
/// 7517](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517#section-4).
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct JWK {
kty: KeyType,
alg: Option<KeyAlgorithm>,
kid: Option<String>,
// Shared modulus
n: String,
// Public key exponent
e: String,
}
/// Representation of a set of JSON Web Keys. See [RFC
/// 7517](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7517#section-5).
#[derive(Deserialize)]
pub struct JWKS {
// This is a vector instead of some kind of map-like structure
// because key IDs are in fact optional.
//
// Technically having multiple keys with the same KID would not
// violate the JWKS-definition either, but behaviour in that case
// is unspecified.
keys: Vec<JWK>,
}
impl JWKS {
/// Attempt to find a JWK by its key ID.
pub fn find(&self, kid: &str) -> Option<&JWK> {
self.keys.iter().find(|jwk| jwk.kid == Some(kid.into()))
}
}
/// Representation of an undecoded JSON Web Token. See [RFC
/// 7519](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519).
pub struct JWT (String);
/// Representation of a decoded and validated JSON Web Token.
///
/// Specific claim fields are only decoded internally in the library
/// for validation purposes, while it is generally up to the consumer
/// of the validated JWT what structure they would like to impose.
pub struct ValidJWT {
/// JOSE header of the JSON Web Token. Certain fields are
/// guaranteed to be present in this header, consult section 5 of
/// RFC7519 for more information.
pub headers: Value,
/// Claims (i.e. primary data) contained in the JSON Web Token.
/// While there are several registered and recommended headers
/// (consult section 4.1 of RFC7519), the presence of no field is
/// guaranteed in these.
pub claims: Value,
}
/// Possible token claim validations. This enumeration only covers
/// common use-cases, for other types of validations the user is
/// encouraged to inspect the claim set manually.
pub enum Validation {}
/// Possible results of a token validation.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub enum ValidationError {
/// Token was malformed (various possible reasons!)
MalformedJWT,
/// Decoding of the provided JWK failed.
InvalidJWK,
/// Signature validation failed, i.e. because of a non-matching
/// public key.
InvalidSignature,
/// An OpenSSL operation failed along the way at a point at which
/// a more specific error variant could not be constructed.
OpenSSL(ErrorStack),
/// JSON decoding into a provided type failed.
JSON(serde_json::Error),
/// One or more claim validations failed.
// TODO: Provide reasons?
InvalidClaims,
}
type JWTResult<T> = Result<T, ValidationError>;
impl From<ErrorStack> for ValidationError {
fn from(err: ErrorStack) -> Self { ValidationError::OpenSSL(err) }
}
impl From<serde_json::Error> for ValidationError {
fn from(err: serde_json::Error) -> Self { ValidationError::JSON(err) }
}
/// Attempt to extract the `kid`-claim out of a JWT's header claims.
///
/// This function is normally used when a token provider has multiple
/// public keys in rotation at the same time that could all still have
/// valid tokens issued under them.
///
/// This is only safe if the key set containing the currently allowed
/// key IDs is fetched from a trusted source.
pub fn token_kid(jwt: &JWT) -> JWTResult<Option<String>> {
// Fetch the header component of the JWT by splitting it out and
// dismissing the rest.
let parts: Vec<&str> = jwt.0.splitn(2, '.').collect();
if parts.len() != 2 {
return Err(ValidationError::MalformedJWT);
}
// Decode only the first part of the token into a specialised
// representation:
#[derive(Deserialize)]
struct KidOnly {
kid: Option<String>,
}
let kid_only: KidOnly = deserialize_part(parts[0])?;
Ok(kid_only.kid)
}
/// Validate the signature of a JSON Web Token and optionally apply
/// claim validations. Signatures are always verified before claims,
/// and if a signature verification passes *all* claim validations are
/// run and returned.
///
/// If validation succeeds a representation of the token is returned
/// that contains the header and claims as simple JSON values.
///
/// It is the user's task to ensure that the correct JWK is passed in
/// for validation.
pub fn validate(token: String,
jwk: &JWK,
validations: Vec<Validation>) -> JWTResult<ValidJWT> {
let jwt = JWT(token);
let public_key = public_key_from_jwk(&jwk)?;
validate_jwt_signature(&jwt, public_key)?;
// Split out all three parts of the JWT this time, deserialising
// the first and second as appropriate.
let parts: Vec<&str> = jwt.0.splitn(3, '.').collect();
if parts.len() != 3 {
// This is unlikely considering that validation has already
// been performed at this point, but better safe than sorry.
return Err(ValidationError::MalformedJWT)
}
let headers = deserialize_part(parts[0])?;
let claims = deserialize_part(parts[1])?;
let valid_jwt = ValidJWT { headers, claims };
Ok(valid_jwt)
}
// Internal implementation
//
// The functions in the following section are not part of the public
// API of this library.
/// Decode a single key fragment (base64-url encoded integer) to an
/// OpenSSL BigNum.
fn decode_fragment(fragment: &str) -> JWTResult<BigNum> {
let bytes = decode_config(fragment, URL_SAFE)
.map_err(|_| ValidationError::InvalidJWK)?;
BigNum::from_slice(&bytes).map_err(Into::into)
}
/// Decode an RSA public key from a JWK by constructing it directly
/// from the public RSA key fragments.
fn public_key_from_jwk(jwk: &JWK) -> JWTResult<Rsa<Public>> {
let jwk_n = decode_fragment(&jwk.n)?;
let jwk_e = decode_fragment(&jwk.e)?;
Rsa::from_public_components(jwk_n, jwk_e).map_err(Into::into)
}
/// Decode a base64-URL encoded string and deserialise the resulting
/// JSON.
fn deserialize_part<T: DeserializeOwned>(part: &str) -> JWTResult<T> {
let json = base64::decode_config(part, URL_SAFE)
.map_err(|_| ValidationError::MalformedJWT)?;
serde_json::from_slice(&json).map_err(Into::into)
}
/// Validate the signature on a JWT using a provided public key.
///
/// A JWT is made up of three components (headers, claims, signature)
/// - only the first two are part of the signed data.
fn validate_jwt_signature(jwt: &JWT, key: Rsa<Public>) -> JWTResult<()> {
let key = PKey::from_rsa(key)?;
let mut verifier = Verifier::new(MessageDigest::sha256(), &key)?;
// Split the token from the back to a maximum of two elements.
// There are technically three components using the same separator
// ('.'), but we are interested in the first two together and
// splitting them is unnecessary.
let token_parts: Vec<&str> = jwt.0.rsplitn(2, '.').collect();
if token_parts.len() != 2 {
return Err(ValidationError::MalformedJWT);
}
// Second element of the vector will be the signed payload.
let data = token_parts[1];
// First element of the vector will be the (encoded) signature.
let sig_b64 = token_parts[0];
let sig = base64::decode_config(sig_b64, URL_SAFE)
.map_err(|_| ValidationError::MalformedJWT)?;
// Verify signature by inserting the payload data and checking it
// against the decoded signature.
verifier.update(data.as_bytes())?;
match verifier.verify(&sig)? {
true => Ok(()),
false => Err(ValidationError::InvalidSignature),
}
}